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Symposium: Managing Mixed Migration
Reimagining Sovereignty to Protect Migrants
Pooja R. Dadhania†
The concept of sovereignty in international law allows states to exclude
and expel most categories of migrants, subject only to very narrow exceptions
from international human rights and refugee law. Inverting the state sovereignty
paradigm traditionally used to exclude migrants, this Essay reimagines
sovereignty to protect migrants by drawing on the international law doctrine of
state responsibility. The doctrine of state responsibility requires states to remedy
the consequences of their actions in violation of international law. States that
violate the sovereignty of other states, more specifically their territorial integrity
or political independence, and thereby cause forced migration should have an
obligation to provide remedies for it. Such remedies could include providing a
safe haven for migrants. Exploring migration through the lens of state
responsibility may provide new opportunities to expand protection for migrants.
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INTRODUCTION
International law sharply differentiates between categories of migrants,
protecting only a small subset such as refugees. The concept of sovereignty in
international law has long been used to justify the exclusion and expulsion of
other migrants, especially people that a state deems unauthorized economic
migrants. In this Essay, I invert the state sovereignty paradigm that states draw
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upon to justify closing their borders and excluding migrants. I reimagine
sovereignty as inclusion. I use the concept of sovereignty to obligate a state to
protect migrants who are forced to leave their homes as a result of that state’s
uninvited violation of the sovereignty of the migrants’ state of origin. More
specifically, I use the doctrine of state responsibility to establish a state’s
obligation to accept migrants who are traditionally classified as economic
migrants and are forced to leave their homes as a result of that state’s violation
of the territorial integrity or political independence of the migrants’ home state.
I first explore and challenge the concept of mixed migration and its
categorization of migrants into two main categories—those who have a right to
remain in a state under international law because their flight is perceived as
involuntary, such as refugees, and those who do not because their flight is viewed
broadly as voluntary, such as economic migrants. I next introduce the concept of
sovereignty as a traditional justification for the exclusion of migrants and
reframe it to encompass an obligation to protect a subset of migrants who are
forced to flee when a state violates the sovereignty of their home state. I then
sketch a framework using the Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Articles on State Responsibility” or “Articles”)1
to require a state to accept responsibility for its violation of another state’s
sovereignty, including accepting migrants who flee their homes as a result.2 I
conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of the law of state
responsibility in the context of migration.
I.

EXPLORING AND CHALLENGING MIXED MIGRATION

Cross-border migratory flows comprise people of different legal statuses
with wide-ranging reasons for their migration. Migrants can be classified into
various legal and informal categories, including economic migrants, refugees,
environmental or climate migrants, victims of trafficking, and smuggled
individuals.3 The categories of migrants are fluid and overlapping, and migrants
may fall into multiple categories at any given time. The term “mixed migration”
refers to this overlapping and varied composition of cross-border population
flows.4 The fact that some migrants in mixed migratory flows have a right to
remain in a state and others do not creates a dichotomy between migrants.5

1.
See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter
“Articles on State Responsibility”].
2.
I plan to further develop this idea and framework in future work.
3.
See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Challenges of Irregular Migration:
Addressing Mixed Migration Flows, MC/INF/294, ¶ 6 (2008), https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/
shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/work/shops/return_migration_challenges_120208/mixed_
migration_flows.pdf (listing different types of migrants).
4.
See Marina Sharpe, Mixed Up: International Law and the Meaning(s) of “Mixed
Migration,” 37 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 116, 121 (2018) (using the term “mixed migration” to “describe[e]
complex population flows involving more than one legal category of migrant”).
5.
See generally REBECCA HAMLIN, CROSSING: HOW WE LABEL AND REACT TO PEOPLE ON
THE MOVE 1-24 (2021) (critiquing the “migrant/refugee binary” as a “legal fiction” that ignores “the
nuanced patterns of global migration and the lived experiences of border crossers”) (internal quotation
omitted).
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A state has near unfettered discretion to decide who is allowed to enter its
territory and who to exclude, limited only by international human rights and
refugee law.6 The narrow protections provided under international law are
reserved for only a subset of migrants whose flight is viewed as involuntary or
forced.7 In particular, migrants who meet the refugee definition and migrants
who fear torture are distinct under international law because states must not
return them to a state where they fear persecution or torture.8 The definitional
boundaries of these categories of migrants are strictly circumscribed. A
“refugee,” for example, is defined narrowly under international law as a person
who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”9
The term “economic migrant,” by contrast, is often used as a catchall
category for anyone who does not qualify for protection under international law.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has defined economic
migrants as “[p]ersons who leave their countries of origin purely for economic
reasons not in any way related to the refugee definition, or in order to seek
material improvements in their livelihood.”10 Economic migrants generally have

6.
See infra notes 13, 16-17 and accompanying text (analyzing a state’s right to exclude
migrants under principles of internal sovereignty). See generally William J. Aceves, Relative Normativity:
Challenging the Sovereignty Norm Through Human Rights Litigation, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 261, 264-69 (2002) (analyzing developments in international human rights law that have “challenged
the primacy of the sovereignty norm”).
7.
The right to protection under international law does not encompass all migrants whose flight
is involuntary or forced. For example, it excludes migrants fleeing their homes due to climate change. See
United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Providing International Protection Including Through
Complementary Forms of Protection, U.N. Doc. EC/55/SC/CRP.16, ¶ 10 (2005),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/47fdfb49d.html (“Individuals who cannot return to their country of origin
because of natural or ecological disasters do not generally fall under the protection regime of the 1951
[Refugee] Convention.”). See generally Wyatt Sassman & Danielle Jefferis, Beyond Emissions:
Migration, Prisons, and the Green New Deal, 51 ENVIRONMENTAL L. 161, 182-84 (2021) (examining
“sources [that] confirm climate change’s potential to increase migration and displacement of peoples
around the world”).
8.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees [hereinafter “Refugee Convention”] art.
33(1), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (providing that a contracting state may not “expel
or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion”); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“No State Party shall expel, return
(refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
9.
Refugee Convention, supra note 8, art. 1. In common parlance, the term “refugee” often is
used more broadly than its international law definition, including to describe any migrant who flees their
home for climate-related reasons and in response to generalized civil strife. See generally Andrew E.
Shacknove, Who Is a Refugee?, 95 ETHICS 274 (1985). I use the term “refugee” as it is used in international
law: to describe individuals who fall within the definition in the Refugee Convention.
10. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, MASTER GLOSSARY OF TERMS REV. 1, 14 (2006). The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee has defined economic migrants and refugees as mutually
exclusive categories. However, individuals can migrate for a variety of overlapping reasons, including
fleeing persecution as well as improving their livelihoods. Despite the overlapping nature of these
categories, for clarity, I use the term “economic migrant” to refer to individuals who do not qualify for
protection under international law.
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no right under international law to remain in other states.11
So-called economic migrants leave their homes to improve their
livelihoods for a variety of reasons, which may not in fact all be economic or
may have a more attenuated relationship to economic motives. In addition to
seeking employment opportunities, for example, some migrants pursue enhanced
educational opportunities abroad. Others leave due to conditions in their home
state that, though egregious, may not bring the migrants within the purview of
the narrowly crafted refugee definition, such as generalized conditions of armed
conflict, political instability, climate change, and economic collapse. These
conditions may blend safety concerns with the quest for improved opportunities.
International law does not differentiate between these reasons and does not
mandate protection. Due to this lack of internationally prescribed protection,
there is a problematic perception that the movement of economic migrants is
voluntary, unlike the forced migration of refugees.
This perception oversimplifies reality, as does international law. Even if
migrants do not meet the narrow definition of refugee, their flight may
nevertheless be forced. I argue that international law should more closely
scrutinize the motivations of so-called economic migrants. Migrants who leave
their homes due to instability resulting from a violation of their home state’s
sovereignty should constitute a category of migrants that is specially protected
under international law.
II. SHIFTING THE PARADIGM OF SOVEREIGNTY TOWARDS INCLUSION
Traditionally, international law allows states to exclude most migrants,
including unauthorized economic migrants, as a prerogative of their sovereignty.
Sovereignty, or supreme authority within a territory, is a central tenet of the
international system.12 There are two dimensions of sovereignty, internal and
external. Internal sovereignty refers to a state’s control within its own territory.13
External sovereignty, on the other hand, “connotes equality of status between the
states—the distinct and separate entities—which make up our international
society.”14 External sovereignty refers to the “exclusion of external sources of
11. Id. at 14 (“Economic migrants do not fall within the criteria for refugee status and are
therefore not entitled to benefit from international protection as refugees.”).
12. See Stephen D. Krasner, Abiding Sovereignty, 22 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 229, 230 (2001)
(“Sovereign states are the building blocks, the basic actors, for the modern state system.”); Hans J.
Morgenthau, The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 341 (1948) (defining
sovereignty as “supreme power over a certain territory”). The term “sovereignty” in international law has
many meanings. See Krasner, supra, at 231-33 (analyzing four different contemporary usages of the term
“sovereignty”). See generally Aceves, supra note 5, at 261-63 (examining the history of the term
“sovereignty” in international law).
13. Geoffrey L. Goodwin, The Erosion of External Sovereignty?, 9 GOVT. & OPPOSITION 61,
61 (1974) (explaining that internal sovereignty “connotes the exercise of supreme authority by those states
within their individual territorial boundaries”). Internal sovereignty includes both interdependence
sovereignty and domestic sovereignty. Interdependence sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to regulate
its borders. See Krasner, supra note 12, at 231 (explaining that “[i]nterdependence sovereignty refers to
the ability of states to control movement across their borders,” including movement of people, goods, and
ideas). Domestic sovereignty, which can affect interdependence sovereignty, “refers to authority
structures within states and the ability of these structures to effectively regulate behavior.” Id. at 231-32.
14. Goodwin, supra note 13, at 61; see also Krasner, supra note 12, at 230 (“Sovereign states

2022]

Reimagining Sovereignty to Protect Migrants

75

authority both de jure and de facto.”15
An absolutist conception of internal sovereignty justifies a state’s exclusive
control over who lawfully enters and stays within its territory.16 Internal
sovereignty is not absolute in practice and is subject to narrow exceptions from
international human rights and refugee law.17 These exceptions do not extend to
economic migrants, however, and states may turn them away or expel them from
their territories as a function of their sovereignty.
But what if the concept of sovereignty could support an obligation to accept
migrants, in addition to the authority to exclude them?18 I contend that external
sovereignty can support such an obligation in situations where states violate the
external sovereignty of other states.
The principle of non-interference is a central tenet of the international
system and a necessary implication of external sovereignty.19 The United
Nations Charter protects external sovereignty by admonishing member states
against using force or threatening to do so against the territorial integrity or
political independence of other states.20 A violation of the external sovereignty
of a state constitutes a serious breach of international law and can have enduring
negative effects.21 Where states breach this fundamental precept of international
law, they should take responsibility for the consequences of their actions,
including harms to the citizenry of the injured state. Accordingly, I refer to states

are territorial units with juridical independence; they are not formally subject to some external authority.
Sovereign states also have de facto autonomy.”).
15. Krasner, supra note 12, at 232.
16. See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 169-70 (Joseph Chitty trans.,
1867) (“The sovereign may forbid the entrance of his territory to foreigners in general or in particular
cases, or to certain persons or for certain particular purposes.”); see also Ye v. Minister of Immigration
(2009) 2 NZLR 596, ¶ 116 (CA) (“There is consensus at international law . . . that the right to control
borders is a fundamental incident of the sovereignty of a state.”); R. v. Sec’y of State for the Home
Department [2002] UKHL 41 (Lord Slynn); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)
(“It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”).
17. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (describing exceptions to the state’s power to
exclude migrants under international human rights and refugee law).
18. In a different context, Professor Tendayi Achiume also uses sovereignty to support
migration rights. She articulates a new theory of sovereignty to justify the migration of former colonial
subjects to former colonial powers. See E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 1509, 1520-21 (2019) (presenting a “significant reconceptualization of sovereignty as
interconnection . . . specifically, colonial and neocolonial interconnection” to justify the entry of economic
migrants into former colonial powers).
19. See Krasner, supra note 12, at 230 (“An implication of de facto autonomy is the admonition
that states should not intervene in each other’s internal affairs.”).
20. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; see also Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) (“The territorial integrity and political
independence of the State are inviolable.”).
21. See United Nations, International Law Commission, DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY
OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, WITH COMMENTARIES 87 (2001), https://legal.
un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf
[hereinafter
“Commentaries”]
(“Individual breaches of international law can vary across a wide spectrum from the comparatively trivial
or minor up to cases which imperil the survival of communities and peoples, the territorial integrity and
political independence of States and the environment of whole regions.”).
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as “responsible states” and “injured states.”
One potential consequence of the breach of another state’s sovereignty is
political and economic instability. There are many examples in which
responsible states’ violations of sovereignty have led to long-term political and
economic instability in the injured states. The consequences of U.S. military
action in Afghanistan, as well as the aftermath of U.S. military aid to replace
leftist leaders in Guatemala and Nicaragua during the Cold War, are just a few
examples.22 These injured states are still reeling from the political and economic
ramifications of the United States’ actions, and their citizens continue to flee. I
coin the term “state-impacted migrants” to describe this subset of migrants who
are compelled to leave their homes as a result of another state’s violation of
international law.23
III. FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING STATE-IMPACTED MIGRANTS UNDER THE
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
A state that violates the sovereignty of another state should have a
responsibility to accept state-impacted migrants who are forced to flee as a result.
The Articles on State Responsibility, which provide a framework for requiring
states to take responsibility for their internationally wrongful acts, can support
such an obligation.
The International Law Commission, a body established by the United
Nations General Assembly, finalized the Articles in 2001. Many of the principles
enshrined in the Articles are reflective of customary international law.24 The
Articles outline generally applicable secondary rules of international
responsibility that provide the consequences of a violation of a primary rule of
international law. An injured state can invoke the Articles when another state
commits an internationally wrongful act to require that state to rectify the harm
caused by its actions.25 Conduct of a state constitutes an internationally wrongful
act when it is attributable to the state under international law and is a breach of
22. See generally John Quigley, The Afghanistan War and Self-Defense, 37 VAL. U. L. REV.
541 (2003) (questioning the validity of the United States’ claim of self-defense to justify armed action in
Afghanistan); Laura Moye, The United States Intervention in Guatemala, 73 INT’L SOC. SCI. REV. 44
(1998) (analyzing the United States-supported coup in 1954 to overthrow the elected Guatemalan
government); Kenneth Roberts, Bullying and Bargaining: The United States, Nicaragua, and Conflict
Resolution in Central America, 15 INT’L SECURITY 67 (1990) (examining U.S. military aid and action in
Nicaragua).
23. Generalized civil strife does not create a viable claim for refugee status in the absence of
targeted persecution. See Hugo Storey, Armed Conflict in Asylum Law: The “War-Flaw”, 31 REFUGEE
SUR. Q. 1, 4 (2012) (quoting 1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries Delegate Neremiah Robinson as stating
that the Refugee Convention did not cover individuals ‘fleeing from hostilities unless they were otherwise
covered by Art[icle] 1 of the Refugee Convention’”) (internal quotation omitted).
24. See JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 90, 92 (2013) (finding
that international and national tribunals cited the Articles over 150 times from 2001 to 2013 and explaining
that “the position of the Articles as part of the fabric of general international law will continue to be
consolidated and refined through their application by international courts and tribunals”).
25. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 1 (“Every internationally wrongful act of
a State entails the international responsibility of that State.”); see also Commentaries, supra note 21, at
31 (“The emphasis [of the Articles] is on the secondary rules of State responsibility: that is to say, the
general conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible for wrongful actions
or omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom”).
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an international obligation of the state.26
I use the Articles on State Responsibility as a vehicle from which to derive
a responsible state’s obligation to remedy the consequences of its internationally
wrongful acts that that cause forced migration. The primary violation of
international law for which the Articles can be invoked is the violation of the
external sovereignty of another state. The violation of another state’s external
sovereignty is a clear breach of one of the most fundamental norms of
international law. The United Nations Charter establishes the primacy of external
sovereignty and requires states to respect the political independence and
territorial integrity of other states.27
When a state commits an internationally wrongful act, the Articles provide
a set of legal consequences, including cessation of the wrongful act, reparation
for the injury, and satisfaction.28 In cases where one state’s violation of the
sovereignty of another state triggers adverse effects in the injured state, the
responsible state is legally obligated to provide a remedy for the harms of those
adverse effects.29
The Articles require a responsible state to make “full reparation for the
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”30 Reparation by the state
“must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act
had not been committed.”31 Injury, as contemplated by the Articles, refers not
only to material damage, but also moral damage, to a state and its nationals.32
Moral damage to a state’s nationals can include “individual pain and suffering,
loss of loved ones or the personal affront associated with an intrusion into one’s
home or private life.”33
In the case of a violation of sovereignty, full reparation for material and
moral damage to an injured state’s nationals may not be possible with only
monetary remedies. Giving lawful status in the responsible state to stateimpacted migrants may be a more effective remedy.34 Moreover, it is consistent
with the primary form of reparation contemplated by the Articles, restitution,

26. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 2; see also United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 56. International obligations encompass
both treaty and nontreaty obligations. Commentaries, supra note 21, at 35.
27. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
28. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, arts. 28-41.
29. Id. at arts. 28, 30-31.
30. Id. at art. 31.
31. Factory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept.
13).
32. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 31, § 5; see also CRAWFORD, supra
note 24, at 486-87.
33. CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 487.
34. Giving state-impacted migrants lawful status in the responsible state will not always be an
effective remedy. For example, there may be instances when nationals of the injured state do not want to
immigrate to the responsible state due to lack of economic opportunities there. Additionally, it may be
inappropriate to propose migration if the responsible state has committed human rights abuses against
nationals of the injured state or if the responsible state started a war of aggression with the injured state.
This proposal is most effective in instances involving responsible states that are more economically
developed and are not hostile towards the injured states’ nationals.
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which can take many forms.35 The purpose of restitution is to “re-establish the
situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed.”36 Monetary
damages may not suffice to reestablish the situation for state-impacted migrants
that existed before the breach of sovereignty if the responsible state’s actions
caused long-lasting political and economic instability in the injured state. To best
restore state-impacted migrants to the position of safety and economic security
they enjoyed before the violation of sovereignty, the responsible state may be
required to accept these migrants.
Using the Articles as a framework to protect state-impacted migrants is not
without challenges. For one, states would need to establish a causal link between
the internationally wrongful act and the flight of state-impacted migrants,
especially when some time has elapsed since the wrongful act and when there
are multiple factors contributing to the flight.37 A second potential challenge
involves standing: the Articles on State Responsibility are state-centric and
generally contemplate invocation by states rather than individuals.38 While some
states might be willing to facilitate the emigration of their citizens, as Vietnam
and Mexico have done,39 other states may be reluctant to do so for a host of
reasons including potential concerns about losing skilled workers or harming
relations with the responsible state.40 A final set of challenges involves logistics.

35. Commentaries, supra note 21, at 97-98 (“The term ‘restitution’ in article 35 . . . has a broad
meaning, encompassing any action that needs to be taken by the responsible State to restore the situation
resulting from its internationally wrongful act.”). The Articles also allow for compensation and
satisfaction. Articles, supra note 1, art. 34.
36. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 35.
37. See Commentaries, supra note 21, at 92-93 (“[T]he subject matter of reparation is, globally,
the injury resulting from and ascribable to the wrongful act, rather than any and all consequences flowing
from an internationally wrongful act.”); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 2424, at 492-93, 495-98
(discussing the causation requirement for reparation for injury caused by an internationally wrongful act
as well as concurrent causes of damage).
38. See Commentaries, supra note 21, at 95 (“The [A]rticles do not deal with the possibility of
the invocation of responsibility by persons or entities other than States . . . . It will be a matter for the
particular primary rule to determine whether and to what extent persons or entities other than States are
entitled to invoke responsibility on their own account.”). First and foremost, an injured state can invoke
responsibility. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, arts. 42, 46; see also Commentaries, supra
note 21, at 116-17 (“Central to the invocation of responsibility is the concept of the injured State. . . .
Article 42 provides that the implementation of State responsibility is in the first place an entitlement of
the ‘injured State.’”). Other states can invoke responsibility in limited circumstances, including where the
responsible state breached an obligation that it owed to the international community as a whole, such as a
breach of a peremptory norm of international law. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 48;
see Brigitte Stern, A Plea for ‘Reconstruction of International Responsibility 95-96, in INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005)
(“This dualism concerning wrongful acts leads to two different systems for invoking responsibility, the
first being open to the injured State, whereas the second may be used by States other than the injured
State.”).
39. For example, Vietnam agreed to facilitate the departure of refugees in 1979 through the
Orderly Departure Programme. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Flight from Indochina, in THE
STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES 2000: FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 79, 86 (2000),
https://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bad0.pdf. The Mexican consulate provides funding to U.S. nonprofit
organizations to assist Mexican nationals with immigration processing in the United States. See Catholic
Charities of the Diocese of Raleigh, Mexican Consulate Awards Funding to Catholic Charities for
Immigration Work (2017), https://www.catholiccharitiesraleigh.org/mexican-consulate-awards-fundingto-catholic-charities-for-immigration-work/.
40. See Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, Migration Policy Institute, Reassessing the Impacts of
Brain Drain on Developing Countries (2005), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/reassessing-
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As a policy matter, responsible states may be concerned that accepting stateimpacted migrants will open the so-called floodgates and overwhelm them.41
Additionally, principled criteria for distinguishing between state-impacted
migrants and other migrants from the injured state would be needed. Despite
these potential challenges, the doctrine of state responsibility nevertheless
provides a creative avenue to rethink the protection of economic migrants and
more broadly to reconceptualize responsibility for violations of sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
The strict dichotomy between refugees, whose migration is protected under
international law, and economic migrants, whose migration is viewed as
voluntary and thus not protected, is insufficient to capture the varied motivations
that prompt human movement. Among those who migrate are “state-impacted
migrants,” whose flight should not be construed as voluntary and who warrant
protection under international law. I reimagine the concept of sovereignty,
traditionally used to exclude migrants, to instead support the migration of stateimpacted migrants. The Articles on State Responsibility may require states to
remedy the adverse consequences of violations of the sovereignty of other states,
which can include the responsible state providing a safe haven for state-impacted
migrants who are compelled to leave their homes as a result of the responsible
state’s actions.
Beyond violations of sovereignty, actions of states can have broad
ramifications in other states in an increasingly interconnected international
system. State responsibility can extend to a broad range of activities that cause
migration, including actions affecting the environment and states’ economies.
The law of state responsibility thus can be a vehicle for more expansive
protection for migrants, including those forced to flee due to climate change and
economic imperialism caused by a state’s violation of international law. At a
time when global political will to craft new treaties to protect migrants remains
low and exclusionary rhetoric is the norm, it becomes more important to use
existing sources of international law to protect migrants more expansively.42 The
Articles on State Responsibility are one such option and may afford protection
to so-called economic migrants.

impacts-brain-drain-developing-countries.
41. Many receiving states erroneously perceive migration as causing a net harm to their
economies. In actuality, migration can result in long-term net positive benefits for many receiving states.
See, e.g., Jonathan Portes, The Economics of Migration, 18 CONTEXTS 12 (2019); Uri Dadush & Mona
Niebuhr, “The Economic Impact of Forced Migration,” CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (2016),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/04/22/economic-impact-of-forced-migration-pub-63421.
42. See, e.g., BBC, Covid: Biden to Continue Trump’s Title 42 Migration Expulsions (Aug. 3,
2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-58077311 (“I can say quite clearly: don’t come over
. . . . Don’t leave your town or community.”) (quoting U.S. President Joe Biden); Andrew Byrne, Jeevan
Vasagar & Alex Barker, East-West Tensions Break Out Over Call to Share Migrant Burden, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/ef5179bc-4ff7-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd#
axzz3kSi3wjWA (“Ninety-five per cent of these people are economic migrants . . . . We will not assist
this foolish idea of accepting anybody regardless of whether or not they are economic migrants.”) (quoting
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico).

